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Status of Double Jeopardy and
Forfeiture Law in the Sixth Circuit
BY STEFAN D. CASSELLA*
INTRODUCTION
O n July 13, 1995, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
criminal conviction of Guy Jerome Ursery on the ground that
the conviction and the earlier civil forfeiture of Ursery's property
subjected him to multiple punishments for the same offense in separate
proceedings in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.' The decision followed the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United
States v. $405,089.23,2 in which the court ordered the return of drug pro-
ceeds to a convicted felon on the ground that a civil forfeiture that
follows a criminal conviction for the same offense violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause.3
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has followed Ursery in dismissing a
criminal conviction that occurred after a civil forfeiture,4 and the Tenth
* Deputy Chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of
the United States Department of Justice. B.S. 1973, Comell University; J.D.
1978, Georgetown University. The views expressed in this Article are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of
Justice.
'United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346).
2 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), modified, 56 F.3d 41 (1995), cert. granted,
64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346).
' The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "[N]or shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V. On January 12, 1996, the Supreme Court granted the government's
petitions for certiorari in $405,089.23 and Ursery. 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484
(U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346). These cases will be heard in April,
1996, and a decision is expected before the end of the Court's current term in
June.
4 United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Circuit has followed $405,089.23 in vacating a civil forfeiture that
occurred after a conviction.' These cases immediately cast doubt on the
status of hundreds of criminal convictions obtained in recent years
following the civil or administrative forfeiture of the defendant's
property. Indeed, federal prisoners throughout the country have filed an
avalanche of motions to vacate their sentences on double jeopardy
grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.6 Likewise, convicted defendants,
invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), have sought to overturn
civil forfeitures that were completed after the defendant's conviction on
criminal charges.7
Ursery, $405,089.23, and their progeny have also prompted defen-
dants in pending cases to move to dismiss their indictments on double
jeopardy grounds because of an earlier civil forfeiture, or to move to
dismiss a pending forfeiture because of an earlier conviction. Several
courts have allowed defendants whose forfeiture-based double jeopardy
laws were rejected by the district court to make an interlocutory appeal,
thus delaying the start of the criminal trial.'
This flood of double jeopardy litigation has produced a rapidly
changing body of law. This Article reviews the status of Sixth Circuit law
5 United States v. S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution ... may move
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
7 The provisions of FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) that have been cited most often
are paragraphs (5) and (6) which provide as follows:
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
See, e.g., United States v. 3947 Locke Ave., 164 F.R.D. 496 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(rejecting claims under both paragraphs).
8 See United States v. German, 76 F.3d 315 (10th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Washington, 69 F.3d 401
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682 (9th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1995).
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on double jeopardy and forfeiture- and outlines the issues likely to arise
when § 2255 and Rule 60(b) motions are filed in closed cases, and
motions to dismiss indictments and civil complaints are filed in pending
cases.9 It also discusses some of the ways double jeopardy problems may
be avoided in future cases,"0 and it concludes with a discussion of the
possible outcomes of the Supreme Court's review of Ursery and
$405,089.23."
I. RESPONDING TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY CHALLENGES
To prevail on a motion to vacate or a motion to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds, a criminal defendant or civil claimant must establish
the five elements of a double jeopardy violation. The party claiming
double jeopardy must show that there were (1) two punishments, (2)
imposed in separate proceedings, (3) for the same offense, (4) by the
same sovereign, (5) against the same defendant.' In addition, because
the Double Jeopardy Clause protects only against the imposition of, or the
attempt to impose, a second punishment, the defendant must show that
the alleged subsequent punishment that he is seeking to vacate or avoid
occurred or would occur second in time. 3 The following sections
discuss the status of the law in the Sixth Circuit on these six points.
A. Punishment
Whether forfeiture constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes depends primarily on the relationship of the property to the
underlying offense. Is the property the proceeds of a crime? Property
used to facilitate its commission? Contraband? The corpus delicti 4 of
the offense?
9 See infra notes 12-137 and accompanying text.
'o See infra notes 138-57 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
12 United States v. $184,505.01, 72 F.3d 1160, 1166-67 & n.13 (3d Cir.
1995) (listing all elements except "same sovereign"); Santiago-Fraticelli v.
United States, No. 95-1690 (JAF), 1996 WL 78178 (D.P.R. Feb. 15, 1996)
(listing all five elements); United States v. Nauracy, Nos. 95-C-7241, 92-CR-914,
1996 WL 89083 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 1996).
13Id. at 1165.
14 The corpus delicti is "[t]he body (material substance) upon which a crime
has been committed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (6th ed. 1990).
1995-96]
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Most of the controversy concerns "facilitating property," or property
that makes the underlying criminal offense easier to commit or harder to
detect. 5 In Ursery, the Sixth Circuit held that the forfeiture of real
property used to facilitate a drug offense under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) 6
constituted punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.'7 The court stated broadly that, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Austin v. United States," "any civil forfeiture under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purpos-
es.""9 Given this categorical approach, it is likely that the Sixth Circuit
would view the forfeiture of other kinds of facilitating property, such as
vehicles forfeited under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), as "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes.20
Other courts decline to apply Austin's categorical approach to double
jeopardy cases. In those courts, the test of whether a forfeiture constitutes
"punishment" is the fact-based "rational relationship" test set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Halper.2' Under this
case-by-case approach, a given forfeiture may or may not be considered
punishment for double jeopardy purposes, depending on the relationship
of the property to the underlying crime. For example, the Second Circuit
has held that a civil sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes only if it is overwhelmingly disproportionate to the harm caused
by the defendant's act.2 As a result, in some courts, even the forfeiture
"s See, e.g., United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990)
(defining facilitating property).
16 The property in question was the land on which marijuana was grown.
United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted 64
U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346).
17 Id.
18 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (holding that civil forfeitures under 21
U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) (1994) are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment).
19 Ursery, 59 F.3d at 573 (emphasis added).
20 See United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying
Ursery's approach to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) cases and finding that they are
always punishment); United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th
Cir. 1996) (applying categorical approach to both proceeds and facilitating
property).
21 490 U.S. 435, 448-50 (1989).
22 United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 171 (1995). See also United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir.
1995) (applying the Halper rational relationship test to contraband); United States
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of facilitating property may be considered "remedial" or "non-punitive"
in some circumstances.23
The courts that take the case-by-case approach have the better
argument. Austin itself recognizes that just because the Eighth Amend-
ment applies to all forfeitures it does not follow that all forfeitures
constitute punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. Similarly, the
Double Jeopardy Clause may apply to all forfeitures categorically, but not
all forfeitures constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes.2 4
Courts should have to review the facts of each case under the Halper
standard to determine if the civil sanction is rationally related to the
underlying crime. Only where the forfeitures fail to satisfy the rational
relationship test should it constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.
v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 298-99 (5th Cir.) (applying Halper test to proceeds and
finding that the forfeiture was rationally related to the costs of government and
society), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994); United States v. No. 14-1, 899 F.
Supp. 1415, 1422 (D.V.I. 1995) (scheduling evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the forfeiture approximated the government's costs and damages making
it remedial under the rational relationship test); Dawkins v. United States, 883
F. Supp. 83, 88-89 (E.D. Va.) (following Tilley and applying Halper to
proceeds), aff'd, 67 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 1995). But see United States v. All Assets
of G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 491 (2d Cir. 1995) (questioning
whether Halper's fact-based analysis is still good law or whether the proper
approach is to examine the statute).
' See United States v. 100 Chadwick Drive, 913 F. Supp. 430 (W.D.N.C.
1995) (holding the Halper analysis survives Austin; civil sanction is punishment
only where it is solely deterrent or retributive and not partially remedial in
purpose); Garciav. United States, Nos. C-95-2782 DLJ, CR-90-0168 DLJ, 1996
WL 69803 (M.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 1996) (forfeiture of used car so disproportionate,
in negative sense, to the magnitude of the area that it cannot be considered
punishment); (United States v. Erinkitola, 901 F. Supp. 80, 84-85 (N.D.N.Y.
1995) (forfeiture of car driven to scene of drug offense is "remedial" because it
removes instrumentality of the crime from circulation); United States v. Ramos-
Oseguera, 900 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (forfeiture of telephone
used to commit drug offense is the "trivial opposite of the excessive sanction"
and thus cannot be punishment); No. 14-I, 899 F. Supp. at 1420-21 (forfeiture
of facilitating property may be remedial under Halper, so case-by-case analysis
is required).




Ursery's adoption of the categorical approach appears to foreclose the
reliance on the rational relationship test in Sixth Circuit facilitation cases.
However, the Court of Appeals left the door open with its subsequent
decision in United States v. Salina, 25 in which it held the forfeiture of
drug proceeds to be remedial, rather than punitive in nature, because such
actions are "inherently proportional to the damages caused by the illegal
activity." 6 The court then proceeded to distinguish facilitation cases
which involved vehicles and real property from proceeds cases because
the forfeitures in facilitation cases "bear no relation to the underlying
offense."27 But not all facilitation cases fit that description; many times
facilitating property is forfeited because its use was essential to the
commission of the underlying offense and the forfeiture thus serves the
remedial purpose of making the crime impossible to commit in the future.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit might yet apply the fact-based Halper test if faced
with a purely remedial situation such as the forfeiture of a leasehold
interest under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) to shut down a crack house.
In any event, Salinas makes it clear that the categorical approach
applies only to the forfeiture of facilitating property, while the Halper test
still applies to other types of forfeiture.28 Thus, not only is the forfeiture
of proceeds not considered "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes
in the Sixth Circuit,29 but other forfeitures, such as the forfeiture of
25 65 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 1995).
26 Id. at 554. The court further noted that "one never acquires a property
right to proceeds." Id.
27 Id. at 553 (citing Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300).
28 Id.
29 Id. See also Smith v. United States, 76 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1996) ("There
is... no reason to conclude that the forfeiture of property or money exchanged
for contraband... is anything but remedial."); United States v. $184,505.01, 72
F.3d 1160, 1168-69 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that forfeiture of proceeds is not
punishment); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that forfeiture of proceeds is "rationally related to the damages of that
activity"); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir.) (finding that
forfeiture of proceeds is not punitive, so double jeopardy not implicated), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994). Cf United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231,
1236 (8th Cir. 1994) (deciding that forfeiture of proceeds from racketeering is
not punishment and does not trigger Eighth Amendment analysis); SEC v.
Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that an order requiring a
convicted defendant to give up profits of illegal securities trading did not
constitute additional punishment barred by double jeopardy). But see United
States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that forfeiture of
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"exchange money" in a drug case,3" or contraband,3' or the corpus
delicti of a money laundering case,32 may also be considered remedial
if they satisfy the rational relationship test in a given instance.
Finally, the Supreme Courts's recent decision in Witte v. United
States,33 suggests that forfeiture may not be considered "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes if, considered in conjunction with the criminal
penalty imposed for the same offense, the cumulative punishment is no
greater than the punishment which would have been imposed in a single
proceeding. In Witte, the Court noted that in imposing a sentence for an
offense that was previously used to enhance the penalty for an earlier
offense, the court could mitigate the punishment by taking the earlier
proceedsis punishment), modified, 56 F.3d41 (1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346); United States v. 9844
S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with $405,089.23 as to
proceeds).
30 United States v. Erinkitola, 901 F. Supp. 80, 84-85 (N.D.N.Y. 1995);
United States v. Daigle, 894 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (W.D. La. 1995).
3, Clementi, 70 F.3d at 1000 ("Because it simply cannot be punishment to
take from a criminal that which the law forbids him to possess, the forfeiture of
firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) is not punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes.).
32 See United States v. Twenty One Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Two
Dollars, 47 F.3d 972, 973 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that forfeiture of property
being laundered in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 is not punitive and not subject
to Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment if property consisted of criminal
proceeds); United States v. $145,139.00, 18 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir.) (finding that
forfeiture of corpus delicti - undeclared funds in 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1994) case
- does not trigger double jeopardy), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 72 (1994); Ragin
v. United States, 893 F. Supp. 570, 579 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that, under
proportionality review forfeiture of shopping center used to launder drug
proceeds was remedial for double jeopardy purposes); Crowder v. United States,
874 F. Supp. 700, 704 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (finding that proportionality analysis
would be more appropriate than a categorical approach, but deciding the case on
other grounds), affrd, 69 F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Haywood,
864 F. Supp. 502, 508-09 (W.D.N.C. 1994) (finding that proportionality is the
proper test). But see United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66
F.3d 483, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1995) (questioning whether property that has some
legitimate purpose can ever be considered an instrumentality of the crime for the
purpose of finding a forfeiture to be purely remedial); United States v.
$69,292.00, 62 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that forfeiture of
undeclared currency under 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1994) is punishment).
33 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995).
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sentencing enhancement into account and, thus, avoid any double
jeopardy violation.34 Similarly, in forfeiture cases, courts have held that
there is no double jeopardy violation if the court mitigates the punishment
imposed in a related criminal case to take the earlier forfeiture into
account.35
B. Same Proceeding
There is no double jeopardy violation as long as multiple punishments
are imposed in the same proceeding.36 In United States v. $405,089.23,
the Ninth Circuit held that civil forfeiture cases and criminal prosecutions
constitute one proceeding "only if they were brought in the same
indictment and tried at the same time."'37 The Tenth Circuit agrees with
the Ninth Circuit,38 but the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
rejected this approach as one that elevates form over substance. These
courts recognized that civil and criminal cases are always docketed
separately in the federal system, even when related to the same offense.
Consequently, these courts held that civil and criminal cases which are
contemporaneously pending constitute the "same proceeding" for double
jeopardy purposes because there is no likelihood that the government
" Id. at 2209. The Court noted that a sentence within the statutory range
constituted punishment only for the charged offense. Id. at 2208.
" See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 897 F. Supp. 1268, 1271-72 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (deciding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for
double jeopardy purposes if the cumulative value of the civil forfeiture and the
fine imposed in a parallel criminal case does not exceed the maximum statutory
criminal fine, and the defendant agrees to the forfeiture as part of his criminal
plea); United States v. Amiel, 889 F. Supp. 615, 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating
that there was no double punishment where court refrained from imposing fines
and restitution in criminal case following forfeiture in civil case).
36 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989). The Court observed
that "[iln a single proceeding the multiple-punishment issue would be limited to
ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the
legislature." Id.
31 United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994),
modified, 56 F.3d 41 (1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan.
12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346). The court was concerned that the government
would gain an advantage from trying the civil and criminal cases separately. Id.
at 1217.
38 United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
[VOL. 84
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND FoRFEITuRE
instituted one proceeding only because of dissatisfaction with the penalty
imposed in an earlier case and, therefore, the separate civil and criminal
proceedings were not an attempt to enhance the defendant's
punishment.39
In Ursery, the Sixth Circuit found a middle ground. Instead of
adopting either categorical approach, the court held that the question of
whether two cases - one civil and the other criminal - constitute the
"same proceeding" for double jeopardy purposes requires a fact-based
inquiry.4" Under this approach, a court must determine whether the
government instituted and managed the two cases in such a manner that
the cases could truly be considered a "single, coordinated proceeding."'
The Court of Appeals did not specify what "indicia of coordination" were
required to establish that two cases constituted the same proceeding.42
Other courts, however, have relied on factors such as the dates on which
the respective cases were instituted, the degree to which the government
attorneys handling the two cases coordinated their actions with each
other, and whether the government made it clear to the defendant from
the outset of both cases that it was proceeding both civilly and criminally
in order to seek the full range of sanctions available for the offense.43
" United States v. Smith, No. 95-1568, 1996 WL 34552, at *3-4 (8th Cir.
Jan. 31, 1996); United States v. 18755 North Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); see also United States v. Doyer, 907 F. Supp.
1519, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1995) ("Where civil and criminal actions are pursued
contemporaneously, there is no concern, as expressed in Halper, that the
government might act abusively by seeking a second punishment when it is
dissatisfied with the punishment levied in the first action."); Amiel, 889 F. Supp.
at 622-23 (following Millan even though the indictment was filed after entry of
a forfeiture judgment by default because there was no indication that the
government filed the indictment because it was dissatisfied with the default
judgment); United States v. $130,052.00, No. CIV. A 94-D-1654-N, 1995 WL
810351, at *9 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
40 United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346).
41 Id. at 575.
421 Id. In the particular case, the court stated that there was no communica-
tion between government attorneys, the proceedings were instituted four months
apart, and the proceedings were presided over by different judges and resolved
by different judgments. Id.
41 See, e.g., United States v. 321 S.E. 9th Court, No. 88-6171-CIV-PAINE,
1995 WL 789019 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 1995) (civil and criminal cases were part
1995-96]
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There is one situation where it should be absolutely clear that a civil
forfeiture and a criminal prosecution constitute a single and coordinated
proceeding - cases where the defendant, as part of his guilty plea in a
criminal case, agrees not to contest a related civil forfeiture. In that
situation, the defendant by his own action permits the court to merge the
civil and criminal cases so that the defendant's interest in his property is
effectively extinguished at the very instant that jeopardy attaches in the
criminal case with the acceptance of the guilty plea by the court. The
case law on this issue, however, is sparse," and it may be simpler to
of the same proceeding because the property was seized incident to defendant's
arrest, and the two actions were brought simultaneously); Rivera v. United States,
No. 92 Civ. 6100 (DNE), 1995 WL 437691, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1995)
(stating that administrative forfeiture and criminal prosecution were part of a
single, coordinated proceeding where property was seized at defendant's arrest
and the DEA immediately commenced administrative forfeiture proceedings);
United States v. Levine, 905 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that
a forfeiture in California and prosecution in Florida were a single proceeding
because the indictment was filed while the civil case was pending; delay between
entry of forfeiture judgment and completion of prosecution cannot matter where
defendant caused the delay by becoming a fugitive); United States v. All Shares
of Stock of R.S. Cars, Inc., No. 92-5334 (D.N.J. May 31, 1995) (following
Millan and disagreeing with $405,089.23); Amiel, 889 F. Supp. at 622-23
(following Millan, despite filing of indictment after entry of forfeiture
judgment by default, because there was no indication that the government filed
indictment because it was dissatisfied with the default judgment); United States
v. 18900 S.W. 50th St., No. 93-30301/LAC (N.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 1994) (finding
that a civil case filed after indictment but before sentencing is part of single
prosecution).
" United States v. Singleton, 897 F. Supp. 1268, 1271-72 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(distinguishing $405,089.23 where defendant agrees to civil forfeiture as part of
guilty plea; civil and criminal cases constitute single proceeding in that instance);
United States v. Domitrovich, Nos. CS-94-481-FVS, CR-93-295-FVS (E.D.
Wash. May 10, 1995) (discussing but not deciding whether jeopardy attaches in
civil forfeiture case when the defendant agrees not to contest the forfeiture as
part of his guilty plea in a criminal case; holding that in any event, civil and
criminal jeopardy in such case would be simultaneous, so criminal sentence
would not be barred on account of prior jeopardy). But see Oakes v. United
States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 820-25 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (holding that civil forfeiture
and criminal prosecution are separate proceedings and rejecting waiver of double
jeopardy even where defendant pleads guilty and agrees not to oppose civil
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view a defendant's agreement to the civil forfeiture as a waiver of his
double jeopardy rights rather than as a merger of the two cases into a
single proceeding.'
C. Same Offense
There is no double jeopardy problem if the civil forfeiture and the
criminal prosecution are based on separate offenses. At the very least, this
means that there is no double jeopardy violation if the two cases are
based on different conduct.
So, if the defendant is convicted of growing marijuana on one parcel
of land, a second parcel on which marijuana was also grown can be
forfeited civilly without violating double jeopardy.46 Similarly, if the
defendant is prosecuted for possession of drugs with intent to distribute,
he may be required to forfeit, in a separate civil proceeding, the proceeds
of earlier drug offenses for which he was not prosecuted, even if the
arrest on the criminal offense and the seizure of the money occurred at
the same time.47 While there are no Sixth Circuit cases discussing this
point in the forfeiture context, it is consistently followed by other courts.
In addition, there is no double jeopardy violation if a defendant is
separately punished for two offenses arising out of the same conduct, as
long as each offense requires an element of proof that the other does
forfeiture as part of his plea).
4 United States v. Cordoba, 71 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1995) (defendant's
agreement to civil forfeiture as part of guilty plea constitutes waiver of double
jeopardy).
46 United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791, 794-95 (D. Or. 1994)
(holding that forfeiture of one parcel on which marijuana was grown does not
bar prosecution for growing marijuana on a second parcel).
41 United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United
States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Smith, 75 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that forfeiture of facilitating real
property and prosecution for drug offenses that occurred at another location
apparently involved different conduct); United States v. Leaniz, No. CR-2-90-18,
1995 WL 143127, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1995); United States v. Sung Jin
Kim, Nos. 95-00407 ACK, CR No. 91-1505 ACK (D. Haw. Aug. 11, 1995). See
also United States v. $87,118.00, No. 93-C-3127, 1995 WL 491502, at *1 (N.D.
fI1. Aug. 11, 1995) (holding that because the government refrained from
introducing, in the civil forfeiture case, any evidence of the criminal offense of
which claimant was convicted, the civil case could not constitute second jeopardy
for the same offense).
1995-96]
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not.48 The government has argued that the "same elements" test requires
a finding that civil forfeitures and criminal prosecutions are based on
separate offenses in virtually all cases because the civil case requires
proof that property was involved in or derived from the offense, which
the criminal offense does not, and the criminal offense requires proof that
the defendant committed the offense with a particular mental intent,
which the civil forfeiture does not.49
While some courts have adopted this argument,"0 the Sixth Circuit
rejected it in Ursery, holding that "forfeiture and conviction are punish-
ment for the same offense because the forfeiture necessarily requires
proof of the criminal offense."' The court continued, stating that "the
" United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (overruling "same
conduct" test of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) and reinstating "same
elements" test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
4' See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1994) ("It
is not an element of the government's case to prove the involvement of the
property's owner in the commission of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture."),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995); United States v. $477,048.62, 754 F. Supp.
1467, 1476 (D. Haw. 1991) (stating that forfeitures do not require proof of
wrongdoing by claimant).
" See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 902 F. Supp. 1318, 1322 (D. Colo.
1995) (holding that administrative forfeiture and criminal prosecution involve
different elements); United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1214-15 (D.
Alaska 1995) (holding that since civil forfeiture requires the use of property and
the criminal claim requires mens rea, "the civil claim and the criminal offense
each have an element not shared by the other"); United States v. Campbell, Civ.
No. 94-M-2905, Criminal Action No. 91-CR-388 (D. Colo. Jun. 21, 1995)
(holding that § 881 forfeitures did not bar conspiracy prosecution because in the
civil case the focus was on the property, not the owner, and the government was
not even required to prove that the owner was involved in the crime); United
States v. Thibault, 897 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Colo. 1995) (stating that civil
forfeiture requires proof that property was used to commit an offense, and does
not require proof that the owner was involved; the criminal case does not require
the use of property but requires mens rea); Leaniz, No. CR-2-90-18, 1995 WL
143127, at *6 ("The elements for conspiracy are completely different from the
elements required for forfeiture."); see also United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682,
687-88 (9th Cir.) (suggesting that requirement of proof of defendant's participa-
tion in the offense distinguishes criminal prosecution from civil forfeiture for
double jeopardy purposes), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov.
29, 1995) (No. 95-858).
"' United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573-74 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346).
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government cannot confiscate Ursery's residence without a showing that
he was manufacturing marijuana. The criminal offense is in essence
subsumed by the forfeiture statute and thus does not require an element
of proof that is not required by the forfeiture action."'52
This is not a correct statement of the law because under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7), the government can forfeit real property used to grow
marijuana whether the owner was involved in the criminal offense or
not. 3 In Ursery's case, his property would have been equally forfeitable
if a third person had grown the marijuana with Ursery's knowledge and
consent.54 Moreover, even if the criminal offense was properly consid-
ered a lesser included aspect of the forfeiture offense, double jeopardy
would not necessarily bar the imposition of separate punishments. In
numerous instances, the courts have recognized multi-layered offenses
such as racketeering,55 continuing criminal enterprises,56 and money
laundering 7 as separate offenses from their predicates for double
jeopardy purposes even though proof of the over-arching offense
necessarily requires proof of all elements of a predicate offense.58 So,
Accord United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
52 Id. at 574.
5 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994). Cf. Bennisv. Michigan, 64 U.S.L.W. (U.S.
Mar. 4, 1996) (holding automobile used to commit prostitution offense offered
can be forfeited notwithstanding innocence of the owner).
14 Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808-10 (1993) (noting that
civil forfeiture historically punished the owner for knowingly or negligently
allowing his property to be used to facilitate a criminal offense).
55 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
56 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
57 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1994).
" See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) (rejecting a
double jeopardy challenge to a 21 U.S.C. § 848 conviction following earlier
prosecution for predicate drug offense where Congress intended to create separate
offenses and did not intend a choice between them); United States v. Brown, 31
F.3d 484,496 n.20 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that separateprosecutions for money
laundering and predicate offense do not violate double jeopardy even though the
test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), was not satisfied
because Congress clearly contemplated different types of conduct in enacting the
two provisions); United States v. O'Connor, 953 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir.)
(allowing separate prosecutions for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and
predicate offenses), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 924 (1992); United States v. E-
Difrawi, 898 F. Supp. 3, 9 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing Garrett for the proposition that
forfeiture for the money laundering offense does not preclude prosecution for the
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even if the Sixth Circuit were correct in its characterization of civil
forfeiture as a multi-layered offense for which the criminal violation
serves as a predicate, the structure of the statutes and their legislative
history evidence Congressional intent to authorize separate proceedings
and cumulative sanctions.59
In any event, while the Sixth Circuit has stated its position on this
issue in Ursery, that holding applies only to the broad application of the
Blockburger/Dixon "same elements" test to civil forfeitures and criminal
prosecutions generally. It does not necessarily preclude the government's
establishing that the civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution, while
premised on the same conduct, nevertheless were based on separate
statutes with separate elements.
For example, it appears to be universally recognized that a civil
forfeiture based on a substantive drug offense will not bar a subsequent
criminal prosecution for a drug conspiracy, or vice versa, because
conspiracies and substantive offenses are separate offenses for double
jeopardy purposes.60 Similarly, a forfeiture based on the money launder-
predicate offense because Congress intended cumulative punishments), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Moheyeldein, Nos. 95-3137, 95-3153, 95-3144, 1995 WL
686255 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1995).
'9 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(i) (1994) (permitting a civil forfeiture case to be
stayed pending the completion of a related prosecution); id. § 8810) (stating
venue for a civil forfeiture action lies in the district in which a related criminal
prosecution is pending); id. § 847 ("Any penalty imposed for violation of [the
Controlled Substances Act] shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil
or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law." (emphasis added)).
60 United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 688 (9th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1995) (No. 95-858); Clark v. United
States, 913 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Va. 1995) (forfeiture based on 21 U.S.C. § 841
offense does not bar prosecution for § 846 conspiracy); United States v.
Richardson, Nos. 95-C-3669, 93-CR-888-1, 1995 WL 702626 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28,
1995) ( 371 conspiracyto commit § 1955 gambling offense, and § 1955(d) civil
forfeiture are separate offenses). See also United States v. $184,505.01, 72 F.3d
1160, 1171 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that forfeiture of proceeds under § 881(a)(6)
and conviction for drug conspiracy involve separate offenses); United States v.
Leaniz, No. CR-2-90-18, 1995 WL 143127, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1995)
(deciding that a § 881(a)(6) forfeiture does not bar prosecution for § 846
conspiracy); United States v. Shorb, 876 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (D. Or.) (holding
that forfeiture under § 881(a)(7) for using property to facilitate manufacture and
distribution of drugs under § 841 does not bar criminal conviction for conspiracy
and money laundering), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 59 F.3d 177 (9th Cir.
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ing statute will not bar a criminal prosecution for the underlying predicate
offense because money laundering and its predicates are separate offenses
for double jeopardy purposes. 1 The Third Circuit recently held that
forfeiture of drug proceeds under § 881(a)(6) and a criminal conviction
for possession of heroin with intent to distribute are separate offenses
because the former requires that proceeds be derived from a sale or
exchange, which the latter does not, and the latter requires proof of
possession by the defendant, which the former does not. 2
The government is often unable to take advantage of this rule;
however, where the documents supporting the civil forfeiture were
worded so broadly that it is impossible to determine what offense was the
basis for the forfeiture, or whether that offense was different from the
offenses set forth in a related criminal indictment.63 But one court has
held that there is no double jeopardy violation as long as the forfeiture
1995).
61 United States v. El-Difrawi, 898 F. Supp. 3, 10 (D.D.C. 1995); United
States v. $127,158.57, SA CV 93-559 AHS (Eex) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1995)
(holding that conviction for mail fraud does not bar later § 981 money
laundering forfeiture); United States v. Amiel, 889 F. Supp. 615, 623 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 981 forfeiture of laundered fraud proceeds does
not bar prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1341); United States v. Sherrett, 877 F.
Supp. 519, 526 (D. Or. 1995) (deciding that § 881(a)(6) forfeiture does not bar
prosecution for § 1956 money laundering offense based on same underlying drug
offense); Crowder v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 700, 703 (M.D.N.C. 1994)
(holding that forfeiture of property involved in money laundering offense does
not bar prosecution for conspiracy to launder money or drug distribution
offense).
62 $184,505.01, 72 F.3d at 1171. See also United States v. $292,888.04, 54
F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that criminal conviction for drug
conspiracy does not bar civil forfeiture for customs violation under 31 U.S.C.
§ 5317 (1994)); Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 359 (1995)
(holding that criminal conviction for false statement violation does not bar
subsequent forfeiture for failure to report), vacating 864 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Cal.
1994).
63 United States v. Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. 519, 527 (D. Or. 1995). The court
noted that the forfeiture pleadings were broad enough to include conspiracy
allegations, precluding criminal prosecution on that charge. Id. The court said
that "[i]t is immaterial that the government could have constructed its forfeiture








The Double Jeopardy Clause is violated only if two punishments for
the same offense are imposed by the same sovereign. If one punishment
is imposed by a state and another by the federal government, no double
jeopardy violation occurs.
There is no Sixth Circuit decision on this point in the civil forfeiture
context, but courts throughout the country, including the Second, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits, have uniformly held that a state civil forfeiture action
does not bar a later federal criminal prosecution, nor does a state
prosecution bar a later federal civil forfeiture.6" Moreover, double
jeopardy is not implicated where there has been a prosecution for the
same offense by a foreign government and the United States then
commences a civil forfeiture.
66
Defendants frequently challenge the application of the dual sovereign-
ty rule in those cases in which the federal civil forfeiture follows a state
prosecution and is handled by state prosecutors specially designated as
Assistant United States Attorneys for the purpose of handling the
particular case. In such cases, the federal government generally has
"adopted" the forfeiture and intends to return up to eighty percent of the
forfeited funds to the state under the equitable sharing provisions of the
drug and money laundering statutes.6 ' No court has yet declined to apply
" United States v. Sardone, No. CR 93-0597-GT (S.D. Cal. June 19, 1995)
(holding that since the administrative forfeiture could have been based on drug
conspiracy alone, it did not bar subsequent prosecution on substantive offenses).
65 United States v. Pena, 67 F.3d 153, 155-56 (8th Cir. 1995); United States
v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 987 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 815
(1992); United States v. Unger, 898 F. Supp. 740, 742 (D. Or. 1995); United
States v. Mallory, No. CR 93-20113 JW, 1995 WL 419758, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal.
July 10, 1995); United States v. Bradford, 886 F. Supp. 744, 747-48 (E.D. Wash.
1995); United States v. De La Cruz Trujillo, 882 F. Supp. 156, 157 (D. Or.),
aff'd by United States v. Trujillo, 73 F.3d 371 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Branum, 872 F. Supp. 801, 803-05 (D. Or. 1994).
66 United States v. Real Property Located at Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511,
1522 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to allow claimant to fight civil forfeiture on basis
of Swiss prosecution because Switzerland is a separate sovereign), cert. granted,
64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-173).
67 Under 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2) (1994), the property may be transferred to the
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the dual sovereignty rule in that situation, but in United States v. All Assets
of G.P.S. Automotive Corp.,6" the Second Circuit remanded such a case to
the district court to determine whether the federal government was allowing
itself to be used as a "tool" of the State, such that the federal case was really
a state action barred by the earlier State prosecution.69 A similar challenge
in the Sixth Circuit should be expected.
E. Same Defendant
Because double jeopardy is a personal right, a person may assert a double
jeopardy objection only if he was personally subjected to punishment for the
same offense in a prior proceeding. If the defendant was not a party to the
prior proceeding, or the punishment imposed in that proceeding was levied
against another person, there can be no violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause when additional punishment is imposed.
Obviously, this means that a defendant in a criminal case cannot
successfully object to the criminal prosecution on the ground that his wife's
property was forfeited in an earlier civil proceeding.7" Nor can a wife assert
state by "the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service
as the case may be,.. . on such terms and conditions as he may determine."
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3)(A) (1994), the property transferred must "[have] a
value that bears a reasonable relationship to the degree of direct participation of the
State ...... Under Justice Department policy guidelines, if a case is wholly a product
of a states investigation but is "adopted" for the purpose of forfeiture by federal
authorities, the federal government will retain 20% of the forfeited assets to cover the
cost of the federal action and will return the balance to the state. See DEP'T OF
JUSTICE GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING (Department of Justice).
68 66 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1995).
69 Id. at 493-96. See United States v. Pena, 910 F. Supp. 535 (D. Kan. 1995)
(hearing ordered to determine if cross-designation of state prosecutor as Special
Assistant United States Attorney created a "sham" prosecutor).
70 See United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1995)
(defendant in criminal case could not assert prior jeopardy where wife filed claim
in earlier civil forfeiture but defendant did not), cert. denied, Penny v. United
States, 64 U.S.L.W. 3558 (1996); United States v. Austin, No. 93-20097-01,
1994 WL 679952 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 1994) (defendant not punished by forfeiture
of car titled in that party's name), affrd, 64 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Cartagena, No. Crim. 93-225-02, 1995 WL 678208, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 15, 1995) (finding no double jeopardy violation where car was registered
and titled in defendant's wife's name); United States v. Wolf, 903 F. Supp. 36,
37 (D. Or. 1995) (rejecting double jeopardy argument where civil claim was filed
by defendant's son and forfeitures were brought by states); United States v.
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double jeopardy in a civil forfeiture case based on her husband's earlier
conviction for the offense on which the forfeiture was based.7'
Most important, courts throughout the country are virtually unani-
mous in holding that a defendant cannot raise a successful double
jeopardy challenge to a criminal prosecution or conviction on the ground
that an earlier civil forfeiture represented prior jeopardy, if the defendant
never filed a claim in the forfeiture case and accordingly never became
a party to that proceeding. The leading case on this point is United States
v. Torres72 in which the Seventh Circuit held that an uncontested
administrative forfeiture did not constitute prior jeopardy.73 The Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia
Circuits and numerous district courts have followed the Torres hold-
ing.74 Moreover, some courts have extended Torres to uncontested
judicial forfeiture actions.75
Ramos-Oseguera, 900 F. Supp. 1258, 1263-64 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (defendant not
punished by forfeiture of property he claimed was his uncle's).
7" See United States v. Lots 18 and 19, No. 94-10077-CIV-HIGHSMITH
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 1995) (holding that when criminal defendant transferred
forfeited property to his ex-wife, she lacked standing to assert a double jeopardy
claim); see also United States v. $69,292.00, 62 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that convicted defendant cannot assert double jeopardy bar to subsequent
civil forfeiture without demonstrating that he, not his brother, was the owner of
the subject property).
72 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
73 Id. at 1465.
74 United States v. Idowu, 74 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Brown, 76 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. German, 76 F.3d 315 (10th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Pena, 67 F.3d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Moheyeldein, No. 95-3137, 1995 WL 686255, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5,
1995); United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1218 (3d Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3318 (Oct. 17, 1995) (No. 95-630); United States v. Cretacci,
62 F.3d 307, 309-11 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d
188, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Barber, 906 F. Supp. 424, 427
(E.D. Mich. 1995); United States v. Falcon, 902 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Fla. 1995);
Clark v. United States, 913 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Va. 1995); United States v. El-
Difrawi, 898 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Moheyeldein, No. 95-3137, 1995 WL 686255 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1995); Paige v.
United States, 894 F. Supp. 301, 303-04 (E.D. Mich. 1995); United States v.
Belle, 891 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D. Mass. 1995); United States v. Schiano, 897 F.
Supp. 644, 649 (D. Mass. 1995); United States v. Lane, 891 F. Supp. 8, 10-11
(D. Me. 1995).
71 See United States v. $184,505.01, 72 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (3d Cir. 1995)
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The theme of Torres and its progeny is that a defendant cannot assert
that a civil forfeiture constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes if, by not contesting the forfeiture, the defendant never became
a party to the proceeding and thus was never at risk of having his guilt
or innocence adjudicated.7 6 Furthermore, because the defendant was not
a party to the forfeiture proceeding, his claim of ownership was never
adjudicated or established.77
It does not matter what reason the defendant offers for not filing a
claim in the forfeiture proceeding. In particular, the failure to file a claim
is not excused because the defendant feared that his Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination rights would be jeopardized,7" or because the defen-
(holding that a party who never contests a judicial forfeiture is not "in
jeopardy"); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a defendant who does not make a claim to the forfeited property cannot
invoke double jeopardy protection); United States v. Amiel, 995 F.2d 367, 371-
72 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that if default judgment in civil forfeiture became a
final and valid decision there would be no prior punishment because defendants
would have no claim to the property); United States v. Cartagena, No. Crim. 93-
225-02, 1995 WL 678208, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1995) (holding that where
no claim to the property was filed with the court, any punishment from forfeiture
"4exists only in the abstract"); United States v. Unger, 898 F. Supp. 740, 742-43
(D. Or. 1995) (holding that defendant was not punished in uncontested judicial
forfeiture even though he filed claim and cost bond in administrative proceed-
ing); United States v. Smith, Cr. No. 90-40017 (S.D. Ill. May 16, 1995) (finding
that defendant could not raise double jeopardy claim where he did not file a
claim to the property in judicial forfeiture); United States v. Chaney, 882 F.
Supp. 829, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (citing Tomes for the proposition that where
defendant fails to file a claim to forfeited property there is no double jeopardy);
United States v. Martin, Nos. 95-C-609, 90-CR-452, 1995 WL 124126, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1995) ("Jeopardy does not attach to people who are not
parties to the forfeiture action."); United States v. Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. 519,
524 (D. Or. 1995) (holding double jeopardy not implicated by filing of civil
judicial forfeiture if defendant never files a claim). But see United States v.
Brophil, 899 F. Supp. 1257, 1260-66 (D. Vt. 1995) (questioning the correctness
of, and rejecting, Torres).
76 Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465.
7 Id. at 1465-66.
78 See United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 1000 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that assertion of ownership would not constitute Fifth Amendment
waiver because criminal statute only pertains to use of property, not ownership);
Cretacci, 62 F.3d at 311 (holding that failure to file claim in civil case cannot
be excused on Fifth Amendment grounds because assertion of a property interest
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dant's ownership of the forfeited property was evident from public title
records or other circumstances.79 Nor can a defendant excuse his failure
to file a claim by asserting that the government failed to provide him
with adequate notice of the forfeiture and thus violated the Due Process
Clause."0 In the latter event, the court may vacate the forfeiture and
in a civil case cannot be used against the defendant in the criminal case); Barber,
906 F. Supp. at 427 (following Cretacci); Ringor, 887 F. Supp. at 1380-82
(holding that where defendant failed to file claim in forfeiture she cannot later
claim the failure was to avoid self-incrimination); Smith, Cr. No. 90-40017, at
6 (holding that merely filing a claim does not invoke self-incrimination); United
States v. Inocencio, CR 94-954-TUC WDB (D. Ariz. Jan. 4), aff'd, 67 F.3d 309
(9th Cir. 1995).
" See United States v. Idowu, 74 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 1996) (it is irrelevant
that the seizing agency knew defendant was the owner of the property); United
States v. James, No. 95-3135, 1996 WL 89550 (3d Cir. Mar. 4, 1996) (it is
irrelevant that defendant was the titled owner of the forfeited vehicle; because
he never became a party to the forfeiture proceeding, jeopardy did not attach);
United States v. Plunk, 68 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no adjudication of
ownership even though forfeiture documents indicate property was seized from
defendant); United States v. Washington, 69 F.3d 401, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1995)
(no jeopardy when defendant fails to contest administrative forfeiture even where
property was seized from defendant's physical possession); United States v. Rural
Route 9, 900 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (finding defendant's
ownership of the property irrelevant if defendant was not a party to the forfeiture
proceeding because it is status as a party that controls whether defendant has
been punished for double jeopardy purposes); Ragin v. United States, 893 F.
Supp. 570, 574-75 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that defendant was not punished
since he withdrew his claim in the judicial forfeiture); United States v. Lane, 891
F. Supp. 8, 11 (D. Me. 1995) (holding that defendant's failure to file a claim in
the forfeiture prevents a double jeopardy claim despite the fact that defendant's
ownership of the property was not in dispute); United States v. Nussbaumer, 890
F. Supp. 947, 948 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that defendant's claim of his clear
interest in the property is irrelevant because the question is not whether he had
an interest, but whether he was put in jeopardy); Ringor, 887 F. Supp. at 1377
(holding that the "strength or weakness of the [defendant's] connection to the
property cannot form the basis for the double jeopardy determination"); Smith,
Cr. No. 90-40017, at 6-7 (holding that whether it is clearthat defendant owns the
property does not matter as jeopardy cannot attach where no claim is filed). But
see Gainer v. United States, 904 F. Supp. 1234, 1237-38 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding
that uncontested forfeiture of truck constitutes punishment where truck was titled
in defendant's name).
80 See United States v. Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1995)
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require the government to initiate a new forfeiture proceeding," but the
former uncontested proceeding cannot constitute prior jeopardy.
Courts have also strictly construed the pleading requirements in these
cases. If a claim is filed out of time, it is the same as if no claim was
filed at all.82 The same is true for claims that are defective for other
reasons.83 Similarly, if a defendant files and then withdraws a claim, or
files a claim but then does not pursue it, the forfeiture is considered
uncontested for double jeopardy purposes.84 One court has suggested
(stating that interlocutory appeal was limited to double jeopardy claim and court
could not review due process challenge); United States v. Jackson, 904 F. Supp.
1185, 1187 (D. Or. 1995) (reasoning that despite defendant's assertion of lack
of notice, an uncontested forfeiture does not place a defendant in jeopardy);
United States v. Schiavo, 897 F. Supp. 644, 648-49 (D. Mass. 1995) (where
fugitive defendant's failure to receive notice was his own fault, lack of notice
will not excuse failure to file a claim); United States v. Franklin, 897 F. Supp.
1301, 1303 (D. Or. 1995) (lack of notice does not excuse failure to file a claim
where notice was reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of the forfeiture
proceeding).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Volanty, No. 95-1847, 1996 WL 97447 (8th
Cir. Mar. 7, 1996).
82 See United States v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a defendant was not subject to double jeopardy when the defendant's letter was
too late to make him a party to a forfeiture), petition for cert.filed (U.S. Jan. 19,
1996) (No. 95-7546); United States v. Perez, 902 F. Supp. 1318, 1322 (D. Colo.
1995) (holding defendant not at risk of double jeopardy in a forfeiture
proceeding where the defendant filed his statement of intent to contest the
forfeiture too late to make him a party to the forfeiture proceeding); United
States v. Idowu, 74 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 1996) (claim filed without cost bond is
defective); United States v. Castro, No. 95-50480, 1996 WL 89091 (9th Cir.
Mar. 5, 1996) (defendant who filed claim without cost bond abandoned the
property and cannot assert prior jeopardy); Jones v. United States, 900 F. Supp.
238, 240 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (stating that double jeopardy is not implicated where
request to proceed in forma pauperis denied); United States v. Muth, 896 F.
Supp. 196, 198 (D. Or. 1995) ("[A] defendant who fails to file and pursue a
timely, sufficient claim is in the same position as someone who failed to file a
claim at all.").
83 United States v. Idowu, 74 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 1996) (claim filed without
cost bond is defective); Castro, No. 95-50480, 1996 WL 89091 (9th Cir. Mar.
5, 1996) (defendant who filed claim without cost bond abandoned the property
and did not assert prior jeopardy).
84 United States v. Mustread, No. 95-2178, 1995 WL 605495 (7th Cir. Oct.
10, 1995); United States v. Doyer, 907 F. Supp. 1519, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1995);
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that this rule would prevent a defendant from asserting "prior jeopardy"
where the defendant filed a claim in a civil forfeiture and then "confessed
judgment" in an attempt to create a double jeopardy bar to a subsequent
prosecution.85
Finally, there is some confusion in the courts as to whether the denial
of a petition for remission or mitigation of forfeiture, which a defendant
may file in lieu of formally contesting the forfeiture in a judicial forum,
can constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. Most courts
have held a remission petition to be a request for leniency or an executive
pardon and hence the denial of such a petition cannot constitute
"punishment. '8 6 But dicta in two Ninth Circuit opinions suggests that the
issue is not yet settled.87
United States v. Levine, 905 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Ragin, 893
F. Supp. at 575; United States v. Amiel, 889 F. Supp. 615, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1995);
United States v. Franulovich, No. C94-1826C (W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 1995).
85 United States v. Messino, 876 F. Supp. 980, 982 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
86 See, e.g., United States v. German, 76 F.3d 315 (10th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599, 604 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (filing remission petition
"does not serve to contest the forfeiture, but rather is a request for an executive
pardon"), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 19, 1996) (No. 95-7546); United
States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying remission petition
does not causejeopardy to attach under customs procedure into which remission
petitions are considered prior to institution of forfeiture proceedings); United
States v. Villarreal-Lara, 913 F. Supp. 501 (1995) (following Ruth); United
States v. Unger, 898 F. Supp. 740, 743 (D. Or. 1995) (filing remission petition
is "an informal request for mercy" which "is not the equivalent of a claim;"
thereforejeopardy does not attach in an administrative proceeding involving only
a remission petition); Juncaj v. United States, 894 F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (holding double jeopardy does not attach when a remission of forfeited
property is denied); Orallo v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (D. Haw.
1995) (denying remission petition in otherwise uncontested administrative
forfeiture is not prior jeopardy).
87 See United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir.
1995) (noting that defendant "made some showing of opposing the civil
forfeiture" by filing a remission petition in the administrative proceeding, but
holding that jeopardy did not attachbecause no declaration of forfeiture was ever
entered), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-7099);
United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307, 310-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that
administrative forfeiture does not constitute punishment only if the defendant
"utterly renounces" his interest in the property).
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Curiously, in the months following Ursery, the Sixth Circuit has not
addressed these issues."8 In two unpublished opinions, different panels
followed Torres and held that an uncontested administrative forfeiture did
not constitute prior jeopardy. 9 But in its only published decision on this
issue, the court expressly left the matter unresolved.90 Nevertheless, with
virtual unanimity regarding the double jeopardy effect of uncontested
civil forfeitures in other courts, it is likely that the Sixth Circuit will
eventually follow suit.9
F. Timing
Even if a defendant shows that he has been subjected to multiple
punishments for the same offense in separate proceedings by the same
sovereign, he is entitled only to have one of the two sanctions vacated.
Wich sanction is vacated depends on the timing of the two proceedings.
Because there cannot be "double jeopardy without a former
jeopardy," 92 a double jeopardy violation occurs only when the govern-
ment imposes or attempts to impose the second punishment. It is well
established that a prior punishment in a criminal case will- bar the
8 Note that in United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (1995), cert.
granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346),
the court treated the earlier civil forfeiture action as punishment even though
the defendant, by agreeing to a settlement, had consented to the forfeiture in
that case. The Fifth Circuit similarly treats a settlement as a contested
forfeiture for double jeopardy purposes. United States v. Gonzalez, No. 94-
60342, 1996 WL 30687 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 1996). But see United States v. Sung
Jin Kim, Cv. No. 95-00407 ACK (D. Haw. Aug. 11, 1995) (holding, under
Cretacci, that a defendant's agreement to pay a sum of money in lieu of his
forfeiture is a decision to terminate the forfeiture proceedings and
constitutes abandonment of prior interest in the property); United States v.
Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. 519, 524 (D. Or. 1995) (filing of civil judicial forfeiture
does not implicate double jeopardy if case is settled without entry of a
forfeiture judgment).
89 United States v. Adesida, 1995 WL 566929, at *1 (6th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Hooper, 1995 WL 514649, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 29, 1995).
90 United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1995).
91 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
92 United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 669 (1994).
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government from attempting to impose a second punishment for the same
offense in a later civil or criminal case. Under Ursery, the same is true
if the earlier punishment was a civil sanction. It appears to be equally
accepted that if two punishments have already been imposed, a court
must vacate the one that was imposed second in time.93 In the context
of civil forfeitures and criminal prosecutions, however, establishing the
sequence of the two sanctions for double jeopardy purposes has proven
extraordinarily perplexing.
Initially, the government argued that resolution of this "timing" issue
depended upon whether the case was governed by the protection against
successive prosecutions or protection against multiple punishments.94
Under the successive prosecutions analysis, the court determines which
prosecution came first and which came second by determining when
jeopardy "attached" in each case. In other words, because the successive
prosecutions prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the
government's twice subjecting a person to the rigors of a criminal
prosecution, and because whichever prosecution begins second is also the
one that will be barred, it is relevant to determine when each prosecution
began. The rules in this context are well defined: jeopardy attaches when
the court accepts a guilty plea, when a jury is empaneled, or in the case
of a bench trial, when the first witness is sworn.95
9 Most courts assume that it makes no difference whether the civil or
criminal case occurred first; in either case, the latter punishment is barred. See
United States v. Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 188, 192 n.18 (5th Cir. 1995); see also
United States v. Pierce, 60 F.3d 886, 890 (lst Cir.) ("The Double Jeopardy
Clause is a shield against the oppression inherent in a duplicative, punitive
proceeding; it is not a tool by which a defendant can avoid the consequences of
the proceeding in which jeopardy first attached."), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-6474). But in his brief for the United States in the
Supreme Court in Ursery, the Solicitor General argues that the bar against
multiple punishments applies only when the criminal punishment occurs first. See
Brief for United States, at 32-33, United States v. Ursery (Nos. 95-345, 95-346,
1996 WL 84595).
9' See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (defining the
separate prongs of the double jeopardy analysis), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
95 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S.
377, 388 (1975); United States v. Smith, 912 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 1983).
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A civil forfeiture, however, is not a "prosecution."96 It is not a
proceeding in which the procedural protections that attend a criminal case
come into play.97 Thus, the successive prosecutions analysis does not
apply when double jeopardy claims involving civil forfeitures are raised.
As most courts now recognize, the courts must resolve double jeopardy
claims in the forfeiture context under the multiple punishments analy-
sis."
But does it make sense to ask when jeopardy "attaches" when
applying the multiple punishments analysis? Logically, it should not
matter which proceeding started before the other; the constitutional
proscription, in this instance, is supposed to be against the imposition of
a second punishment, not against the institution of a second proceeding.
Thus, if anything, one might think that the relevant question ought to be
"which punishment was imposed first and which was imposed second?"
96 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362
(1984); see also United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 999-1000 (8th Cir.
1995) (holding that civil forfeiture does not implicate the successiveprosecutions
strand of the double jeopardy clause); United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105,
1113 (2d Cir.) (stating that because a civil case cannot result in either a
conviction or an acquittal, the protection against successive prosecutions does not
apply; defendantmust show he is being subjectedto multiple punishments for the
same offense), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 171 (1995).
11 See United States v. $292,888.04, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to civil
forfeiture where imprisonment is not authorized by forfeiture statute invoked by
the government).
9' United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 686-87 (9th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1995) (No. 95-858); United States v.
Idowu, 74 F.3d 387, 390-92 (2d Cir. 1996); Erinkitola v. United States, 901 F.
Supp. 80, 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207,
1210 (D. Alaska 1995); United States v. Singleton, 897 F. Supp. 1268, 1271
(N.D. Cal. 1995); United States v. Groceman, 882 F. Supp. 976, 978 (E.D.
Wash. 1995). But see United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 (3d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3318 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1995) (No. 95-630);
United States v. Pierce, 60 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.), petition for cert.filed (U.S.
Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-6474); United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee
Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1994). As the Tenth Circuit recently
observed, "once double jeopardy analysis was expanded from the criminal to the
civil context, the distinction between these two prongs blurred significantly."
United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448, 1455 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 930 (1995).
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With one exception, however, the courts have declined to analyze the
timing issue in terms of imposition - apparently because it produces
absurd results.99
Take, for example, the case of the intervening civil forfeiture. A
defendant pleads guilty to a criminal offense, but his sentencing is
deferred for several months. In the intervening period, his property is
forfeited in a civil case without his raising any double jeopardy objection.
Should the defendant then be able to object to being sentenced in the
criminal case because the punishment in that case would be imposed
second in time? Relying on Ninth Circuit precedents,00 many defen-
dants have argued exactly that. They assert that under the multiple
punishments analysis, punishment is imposed in a criminal case only
when the defendant begins serving his sentence.' Thus, they argue, a
defendant may not be sentenced in a criminal case if the sentencing date
falls after the entry of judgment in a related civil forfeiture, even if the
forfeiture did not occur until after the defendant pled guilty.
10 2
In resolving the timing issue, the lower courts have avoided this
absurdity by ignoring the distinction between successive prosecutions and
multiple punishments in favor of a common sense approach. For example,
in United States v. Pierce,03 the First Circuit held that it made no sense
to allow a defendant to endure what was arguably an unconstitutional
second proceeding in the hopes that it would "both conclude first and
lead to a more lenient punishment than that eventually imposed in
trial."'' Thus, the court held that the successive prosecutions analysis
would apply to timing issues.'0 5 In United States v. Idowu,'0 6 the
Second Circuit reached the same result for the same reasons, but it held
that it was the multiple punishments analysis that compelled this result.
" See United States v. Emmons, Habeas No. 95-3400-PFK, Crim. No. 92-
10064-PFK, 1995 WL 767306, at *5 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 1995) (vacating a
criminal sentence because a civil forfeiture judgment imposed after defendant
pled guilty, but prior to sentencing, constituted the first punishment).
" United States v. Von Moos, 660 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Armstrong v.
United States, 450 U.S. 734 (1981).
'o' Von Moos, 660 F.2d at 749.
102 Ford, 632 F.2d at 1380.
103 60 F.3d 886 (lst Cir.), petition for cert.filed (U.S. Oct. 19, 1995) (No.
95-6474).
10 4d. at 890.
105 d. at 889-90.
106 74 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 1996).
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In the Second Circuit's view, the constitutional protection is against the
imposition of "successive punishments," not "multiple punishments.'
10 7
Thus, what matters is not when the respective punishments were actually
imposed, but when the government instituted the proceeding that led to
the imposition of each punishment.
This hybrid analysis follows from the Supreme Court's decision in
Witte v. United States.' 8 In Witte, the defendant objected to a criminal
prosecution on multiple punishment grounds. When his objection was
overruled, the government argued that an interlocutory appeal should not
be permitted because no violation of the multiple punishments prong of
the Double Jeopardy Clause could occur until the defendant was actually
sentenced for the second time.'0 9 The Supreme Court, however, permit-
ted the defendant to make an interlocutory appeal, noting that for timing
purposes, the multiple punishments prong should be construed to protect
against both the imposition of a second punishment as well as any
attempt to impose a second punishment."'
If the protection against the imposition of multiple punishments is
understood as a bar against the attempt to impose a second punishment,
the approach to resolving the timing issue in multiple punishments cases
becomes almost identical to the approach used in successive prosecutions
cases. In both instances, the relevant question is whether, at the time one
case reaches a critical stage (the stage at which jeopardy is said to
"attach"), another proceeding has already reached that critical stage. So,
what is relevant for timing purposes in multiple punishments cases is
whether, at the time the government attempts to impose one punishment,
107 Id. at *4-5.
108 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995).
109 Id. at 2204-05.
"0 Id. at 2204. See United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995)
(allowing interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to dismiss indictment on
double jeopardy grounds where claim was based on prior civil forfeiture);
United States v. Washington, 69 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the
argument that an interlocutory appeal is inappropriate until the subsequent
punishment is actually imposed); United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 684-86
(9th Cir.) ("[W]here judgment has been entered in a civil forfeiture
proceeding, and a defendant moves to dismiss a subsequent criminal prosecution
on double jeopardy grounds, we find the pretrial order denying the motion to
dismiss appealableunder the collateral order exceptionto the final judgment rule




it has already attempted to impose another punishment for the same
offense.
Not surprisingly, in developing this hybrid rule, courts have borrowed
extensively from the timing rules in successive prosecutions cases. Thus,
for purposes of the timing analysis in multiple punishment cases, the
critical event in a criminal case - i.e., the point at which the government
attempts to impose punishment - occurs when the court accepts a guilty
plea, a jury is empaneled, or the first witness is sworn.33 In civil cases,
of course, there is nothing analogous to the entry of a guilty plea. So, the
event marking the government's attempt to impose punishment occurs
when the civil case is submitted to an adjudicative hearing,1 2 or if
there is none, when an order or declaration of forfeiture is entered against
the property." 3 This logically follows because the earlier stages of a
.' United States v. Wolf, 903 F. Supp. 36, 37 (D. Or. 1995); United States
v. Singleton, 897 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Ragin v. United States,
893 F. Supp. 570, 574 (W.D.N.C. 1995); United States v. Nussbaumer, 890 F.
Supp. 947, 948 (D. Or. 1995); United States v. Smoot, 890 F. Supp. 948, 949
(D. Or. 1995).
112 See United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (10th Cir.)
(holding jeopardy cannot attach in a civil proceeding until it reaches an
adjudicative hearing, unless claimant settles the case, incurring punishment
before the hearing takes place), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 930 (1995); United States
v. Garcia, Nos. C-95-2782, CR-90-0168, 1996 WL 69803 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18,
1996); United States v. Barber, 906 F. Supp. 424, 427-28 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(stating that in a civil case, if there is a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the
jury is sworn; if there is a bench trial, it is when the court begins to hear
evidence; if there is a settlement, it is when the court enters judgment); United
States v. Aguilar, Nos. 95-C-934, 90-CR-209-3, 1995 WL 214382, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 4, 1995) (deciding that jeopardy attaches on date of forfeiture hearing);
United States v. Martin, Nos. 95-C-609, 90-CR-452, 1995 WL 124126, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20) (attaching jeopardy in a forfeiture proceeding at the time
evidence is first presented to the trier of fact), affd, 52 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Lenz, Cr. No. 93-1286-R (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1995) (finding that
jeopardy did not attach in a civil forfeiture case dismissed on the government's
motion because (1) the case had not yet been submitted to the trier of fact, and
(2) no punishment had yet been imposed).
"' See United Statesv. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a stay of the civil forfeiture case preventedjeopardy from attaching); United
States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no
double jeopardy violation because the agency never entered a final disposition
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civil case - such as the seizure of the property, the filing of a complaint,
and the initiation of discovery - are all analogous to stages in a criminal
case that occur before the defendant is placed in jeopardy. It is the entry
order in earlier administrative forfeiture), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S.
Jan. 16, 1996) (No. 95-7099); United States v. Park, 947 F.2d 130, 133-36 (5th
Cir. 1991) (holding seizure of unreported cash did not constitute prior jeopardy
barring criminal prosecution on CMIR charge where administrative forfeiture was
stayed pending outcome of criminal case), vacated in part, 951 F.3d 634 (5th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Thompson, 911 F.2d 451, Nos. CR 91-60122-HO,
CV 95-6055-HO, 1995 WL 787896, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 6, 1995) (attaching
jeopardy in civil cases when judgment is entered, not when defendant agrees to
forfeiture as part of a criminal guilty plea); United States v. Blumberg, 903 F.
Supp. 33, 35 (D. Or. 1995) (noting that it is not inconsistent for jeopardy to
attach in a criminal case when a plea is entered, and in a civil case when
judgment is entered, because there is no equivalent to a guilty plea in a civil
case); United States v. Lane, 891 F. Supp. 8, 11-12 (D. Me. 1995) (rejecting
argument that jeopardy attaches when government seizes defendant's property);
United States v. Messino, 876 F. Supp. 980, 982 (N.D. IIl. 1995) (attempting to
confess judgment in civil case has no jeopardy effect until court accepts
confession and enters forfeiture order); United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp.
791, 793-94 (D. Or. 1994) (convicting a defendant was the "first" punishment
because entry of the guilty plea preceded the forfeiture judgment); see also
United States v. Mayle, 64 F.3d 660, Nos. 95-5793, 93-5794, 94-5591, 1995 WL
478145, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1995) (reversing prior civil forfeiture on
appeal does not constitute prior jeopardy barring criminal prosecution). But see
United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995) (attaching jeopardy
under United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51 (9th Cir. 1995), in a civil case at the
earliest date on which an answer is filed); Barton, 46 F.3d at 52 (filing an
answer is the earliest point at which jeopardy can attach in a civil forfeiture
case); United States v. Domitrovich, Nos. CS-94-481-FVS, CR-93-295-FVS
(E.D. Wash. May 10, 1995) (discussing but not deciding whether jeopardy
attaches in a civil forfeiture case when the defendant agrees not to contest the
forfeiture as part of his guilty plea in a criminal case; holding that in any event,
civil and criminal jeopardy in such case would be simultaneous, so criminal
sentence would not be barred on account of prior jeopardy); United States v.
Thorpe, No. CR 94-108-S-EJL (D. Idaho Apr. 26, 1995) (attaching jeopardy in
civil case when deadline for filing a claim passes); see also United States v.
Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1210 (D. Alaska 1995) (discussing that, in civil
case, either jeopardy never attached because defendant did not file an answer, or
it attached when default judgment was entered).
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of a judgment in a civil case that divests the defendant of his interest in
his property.
For example, in United States v. Stanwood,"4 a defendant who pled
guilty before any civil sanction was imposed could not object to being
sentenced in the criminal case on account of an intervening civil
forfeiture because at the time the government commenced the criminal
action - i.e., when it attempted to impose the criminal punishment - it
had not yet attempted to punish the defendant in any related case."' If
anything, the defendant in such a case could object only to the civil
forfeiture, because that action represented the government's second
attempt to impose punishment.
This hybrid analysis, however, only applies to the timing issue. If,
notwithstanding the empaneling of a jury or the taking of evidence, there
is no conviction in the criminal case, there is no punishment, and thus no
bar to the civil forfeiture." 6 Similarly, in civil cases, an adjudicative
hearing that does not result in a forfeiture judgment against the defendant
cannot constitute jeopardy in any event because there is no punishment.
In other words, while the timing rules may constitute a hybrid between
"14 United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791 (D. Or. 1994).
"15 Id. at 793-94. See Harrison v. United States, 67 F.3d 307 (9th Cir. 1995)
(entering guilty plea before entering stipulation of forfeiture does not implicate
double jeopardy); United States v. Roberts, 67 F.3d 310 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
double jeopardy not implicated where guilty plea preceded settlement agreement
in forfeiture case); United States v. Pierce, 60 F.3d 886, 889 (1st Cir.) (attaching
jeopardy in criminal case when jury is swom, not when punishment is imposed,
because successive prosecutions analysis applies), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-6474); United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th
Cir. 1995) (entering guilty plea in a criminal case before civil forfeiture is not
prior jeopardy); United States v. Whitby, 896 F. Supp. 898, 901-02 (W.D. Wis.
1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach to a criminal prosecution when the
guilty plea is accepted before a civil forfeiture default judgment is accepted by
a court); Gehring v. United States, No. CR-90-0265-WFN (E.D. Wash. May 10,
1995) (rejecting argument that criminal punishment is imposed when incarcera-
tion begins, and that civil punishment is imposed when defendant agrees to
forfeiture at time of criminal guilty plea); Dean v. United States, No. CR-92-
0239-WFN (E.D. Wash. May 10, 1995) (holding that punishment is exacted in
civil forfeiture at time stipulation of decree of forfeiture is filed); United States
v. Groceman, 882 F. Supp. 976, 978 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (sentencing after guilty
pleas is first punishment where no civil forfeiture is pending at that time).
116 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362
(1984). See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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the multiple punishments and successive prosecutions analysis, the
multiple punishments analysis still governs whether a constitutional
violation occurs. The bar is against the attempt to impose a successive
punishment, not a bar against successive prosecution.
In general, a criminal prosecution cannot be barred as "second
jeopardy" where an earlier civil forfeiture did not result, or has not yet
resulted, in any judgment of forfeiture. That applies to administrative
forfeiture cases in which property has been seized and the period for
filing a claim has passed, but the seizing agency has not yet entered a
declaration of forfeiture." 7 It also applies to civil judicial cases where
a complaint was filed and the defendant responded with a claim and
answer, but the court has not entered a final judgment."'
G. Procedural Issues
As mentioned earlier, defendants have tried to take advantage of the
developing double jeopardy law regarding forfeitures, not only to block
pending prosecutions, but also to vacate their criminal convictions and to
obtain the return of their forfeited property in cases that have been
concluded for some time. Notwithstanding a few celebrated cases to the
contrary, the courts are generally unsympathetic to these challenges, and
have rejected them not only on the merits as discussed above, but on a
variety of procedural grounds as well." 9 The decisions are not always
consistent, but the common theme is that the courts are reluctant to allow
convicted defendants to use an unanticipated change in the law as a "Get
Out of Jail Free Card."
Defendants may seek collateral relief from convictions or sentences
by filing a § 2255 motion.. if the defendant can show flaws in the
conviction or sentence that are "jurisdictional in nature, constitutional in
magnitude, or result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'' Several
courts, including the courts of appeal in the Third and Tenth Circuits,
hold that a defendant may not raise a double jeopardy challenge for the
first time on direct appeal.12 Others hold that a defendant is barred
". United States v. Sanchez-Cobarmvias, 65 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995).
I" United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 1995).
". See infra notes 122-37.
120 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994).
.2. Boyer v. United States, 55 F.3d 296, 298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 268 (1995).
" United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 441 (10th Cir. 1995),petition for
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from challenging his conviction on double jeopardy grounds in a § 2255
motion if he could have made the challenge on direct appeal or in an
earlier § 2255 motion but failed to do so."' The latter cases arose in
situations where the defendant argued that $405,089.23 or Ursery applied
retroactively. 24 In response, the courts held that if indeed those cases
simply stated the law as it had been since the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Halper, then the defendant had no excuse for not
raising the double jeopardy issue sooner.
25
Where courts have allowed § 2255 motions, they have insisted that
the motion be filed in the district of conviction, not the district where the
defendant happens to be incarcerated.'26 This prevents defendants
cert. filed 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1355); United States v.
Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1081-82 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Bethancourtv.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 1032 (1996). But see United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d
507, 513 (7th Cir. 1995) (permitting defendant to raise double jeopardy for the
first time on direct appeal under "plain error" standard); United States v.
$184,505.01, 72 F.3d 1160, Nos. 94-3528, 94-3674, 94-3675, 1995 WL 764552,
at *3 n.12 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 1995) (permitting defendant to raise double jeopardy
for the first time on direct appeal under "plain error" standard).
123 Dawson v. United States, No. 95-2362, 1996 WL 75839 (7th Cir. Feb. 23,
1996) (holding that, if treating civil forfeiture as jeopardy is not a new rule,
defendant should have raised it on direct appeal); United States v. Richardson,
914 F. Supp. 212, 212-13 (N.D. Ill. 1995); United States v. Estrada, Nos. 95-C-
2546, 90-CR-284-1, 1995 WL 476663, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1995) (because
double jeopardy claim was based on Halper, it should have been raised on direct
appeal); Rivera v. United States, No. 92-Civ.-6 100 (DNE), 1995 WL 441615, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1995) (failure to raise double jeopardy objections on direct
appeal forecloses § 2255 motion on same issue); Ragin v. United States, 893 F.
Supp. 570, 573 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (raising double jeopardy in second § 2255
petition, when it could have been raised in the first petition, constitutes an abuse
of the writ); Barker v. United States, 891 F. Supp. 478, 480 (E.D. Wis. 1995)
(denying § 2255 motion where defendantcould have raised doublejeopardy issue
in earlier post-Austin habeas petition, or to the extent the petition is based on
Halper, in his post-Halper direct appeal); United States v. Smith, Cr. No. 90-
40017 (S.D. Ill. May 16, 1995).
124 See Dawson v. United States, No. 95-2362, 1996 WL 75839 (7th Cir.
Feb. 23, 1996).
125 Id. at *4; Barker v. United States, 891 F. Supp. 478, 480 (E.D. Wis.
1995).
126 Leveriza v. Hayes, No. C-95-1138 EFL, 1995 WL 392531 (N.D. Cal.
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convicted in another circuit but incarcerated in the Sixth Circuit from
taking advantage of the favorable case law in that jurisdiction.
Also, courts have held that § 2255 motions only apply to criminal
sentences of incarceration. A court has no jurisdiction under § 2255 to
return property seized under a civil forfeiture statute. 7 The proper
procedural vehicle for overturning a civil forfeiture judgment on double
jeopardy grounds is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)." 8 As has
been true of § 2255 challenges, however, the courts have strictly
construed Rule 60(b) and have been reluctant to use it to vacate
forfeitures in long-closed cases.
For example, in response to claims that $405,089.23 and Ursery
apply retroactively, some courts hold that if the double jeopardy cases do
not state a new rule, then the Rule 60(b) challenge should have been
raised earlier.'29 Alternatively, other courts hold that a change in the
law is not a basis for relief under Rule 60(b). 3 ' Most recently, one
June 28, 1995).
,27 See United States v. Carlos, 906 F. Supp. 582, 585 n.1 (D. Kan. 1995)
(holding that § 2255 is not the proper vehicle for seeking return of forfeited
property); United States v. Gallardo, No. CR-S-90-002969-PMP (LRL), 1995
WL 805851 (D. Nev. Nov. 30, 1995); Clark v. United States, 913 F. Supp. 441
(E.D. Va. 1995); United States v. Jones, Nos. 95-C-2907, 92-CR-427, 1995 WL
443929, at *6 (N.D. 111. July 24, 1995) (holding that § 2255 does not authorize
collateral attacks on civil forfeitures to scare the release of forfeiture property);
Dawkins v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 83, 85 (E.D. Va.) (determining that
forfeitures are civil, not criminal, actions which involve an individuals' liberty
and § 2255 does not authorize return of forfeited property), affid, 67 F.3d 297
(4th Cir. 1995).
18 See United States v. 400 Wrenco Loop Rd., Civ. No. 88-3117-N-HLR (D.
Idaho Apr. 18, 1995) (granting FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b) motion for relieffrom civil
forfeiture judgment where forfeiture followed criminal conviction).
129 See, e.g., United States v. 88843 Ross Lane, 907 F. Supp. 336, 337-38 (D.
Or. 1995) (filing motion four years after civil judgment is not timely if
$405,089.23 does not create a new rule); United States v. One 1956 Mercedes
Benz Gull Wing, Civil No. 89-1617-R, at 5-7 (CM) (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1995)
(stating that if $405,089.23 is not a new rule, then claimant should have been
aware of it at the time he settled the civil forfeiture case); United States v. 12310
Short Circle, 162 F.R.D. 136, 138-39 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (filing motion five years
after civil forfeiture judgment is "inexcusably tardy").
,31 See United States v. 3947 Loche Ave., 164 F.R.D. 496 (D. Cal. 1995)
(rejecting challenges under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6)); One 1956 Mercedes Benz
Gull Wing, Civil No. 89-1617-R (CM) at 5 (FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)); United
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court held that now that $405,089.23 was a year old, any new Rule 60(b)
motion would be denied as not having been filed within one year of the
event rendering the judgment void.'
As these cases indicate, the courts have generally been willing to
apply $405,089.23 and Ursery retroactively, if only to then hold that the
post-conviction or post-judgment challenge is not timely filed. But other
courts have held that the double jeopardy cases constitute a "new rule"
and therefore do not apply to closed cases at all.1
32
States v. One Rural Lot Located at Flamboyan St., 902 F. Supp. 18, 19-22
(D.P.R. 1995) (noting, in addition, that a split in the circuits, without any
controlling First Circuit case, does not represent a change in the law).
' United States v. $94,452.00, No. CV 94-844 H (CGA) (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17,
1995).
132 See Dawson v. United States, No. 95-2362, 1996 WL 75839 (7th Cir.
1996) (proposition that civil forfeiture could constitute jeopardy was not
established as the time of defendant's conviction; therefore, it is a "new rule"
that does not apply retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, reh'g
denied, Teague v. Lane, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989)); Ferguson v. United States, 911,
F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (to the extent that Austin requires a finding that
civil forfeiture constitutes jeopardy, it created a new rule by overturning 89
Firearms; therefore, under Teague v. Lane, defendant cannot rely on Austin or
its progeny in seeking § 2255 review of pre-1993 convictions); Garcia v. United
States, Nos. C-95-2782, CR-90-0168, 1996 WL 69803 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 1996)
($405,089.23 was not dictatedby precedent at the time of defendant's pre-Austin
conviction). United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1212 n.4 (D. Alaska
1995) ("If the interplay between civil forfeiture, criminal prosecution and the
double jeopardy clause is so 'novel' that Falkowski is excused from raising the
issue, then it would appear to be too novel to receive retroactive application.");
12310 Short Circle, 162 F.R.D. at 138-39 (holding $405,089.23 does not apply
retroactively to closed civil cases where motion to vacate is made under FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)); United States v. Knight, No. CR 94-816 H (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20),
affd on other grounds, 67 F.3d 309, No. 96-50145, 1995 WL 576893 (9th Cir.
Sept. 29, 1995). But see Smith v. United States, 76 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1996)
(retroactivity does not apply to double jeopardy claim based on Halper); Oakes
v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 826-27 (E.D. Wash.) (holding on double
jeopardy to civil forfeiture is not a "new rule"); United States v. Stanwood, 872
F. Supp. 791, 797-98 (D. Or. 1994) (holding application of double jeopardy to
civil forfeiture not a new rule, but application of old rule to facts at issue);
United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1305-06 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(holding application of double jeopardy to civil forfeiture not a new rule, but
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Finally, courts have recently held that the defendant waived any
double jeopardy objection he might have raised when he did not assert it
at the time he entered a guilty plea or agreed to the settlement of a civil
case.'33 The guilty plea cases are particularly interesting. In United
States v. Broce, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who entered a
guilty plea without raising any double jeopardy defenses waived the
double jeopardy defense, even if he was not aware of the defense at the
time the plea was entered.'34 Initially, when double jeopardy objections
were raised in the forfeiture context, courts were unwilling to apply
Broce to find a waiver. Most often, they cited cases holding that Broce
did not apply where the double jeopardy violation was apparent on the
face of the record in the criminal case in which the defendant entered his
guilty plea.'35
In United States v. Falkowski,3 6 however, the district court recog-
nized that a double jeopardy violation in the forfeiture context is rarely,
if ever, apparent on the face of the record in the criminal case because a
hearing and examination of the record in the related civil case is generally
application of old rule "in a new factual context").
... United States v. Cordoba, 71 F.3d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Villarreal-Lara, 913 F. Supp. 501, Nos. CRIM. L-89-367, CIV. L-95-
89, 1995 WL 788638, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1995); $94,452.00, No. CV 94-
844 H, at 4-5 (CGA); Kitterman v. United States, 904 F. Supp. 987, 989 (E.D.
Mo. 1995); Box v. United States, 904 F. Supp. 773, 777 (N.D. Ill. 1995); One
Rural Lot Located at Flamboyan St., 902 F. Supp. at 19-22 (D.P.R. 1995);
Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. at 1210-12; United States v. Singleton, 897 F. Supp.
1268, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
,34 488 U.S. 563, 571 (1989).
,31 See United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that entry of guilty plea does not constitute double jeopardy waiver under
Broce where court could resolve double jeopardy claims without an evidentiary
hearing); Oakes, 872 F. Supp. at 825-26 (holding that there was no double
jeopardy waiver, despite guilty plea, because Fifth Amendment violation was
apparent on the face of the indictment); Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. at 796-97
(stating no waiver despite guilty plea, because no evidentiary hearing would be
required); see also United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 1995)
(excusing failure to raise double jeopardy at pre-trial because Austin had been
decided only two days before), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3477, 3484 (U.S. Jan.
12, 1996) (Nos. 95-345, 95-346).
136 900 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Alaska 1995).
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required to determine if the forfeiture and the prosecution were for the
same offense under the Blockburger test.137
II. AVOIDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROBLEMS IN FUTURE CASES
Double jeopardy can always be avoided if it is possible to pursue
forfeiture as part of the criminal case; 3 ' but criminal forfeiture, for a
variety of reasons, is not always a viable option. In particular, criminal
forfeiture is not possible where there is no criminal forfeiture statute,
where the defendant is a fugitive, where the property in question belongs
to a third party, or where the property was derived from, or used to
commit, an offense other than the specific act for which the defendant is
being prosecuted.139 Criminal forfeiture is also problematic in cases
where the property does belong to the defendant but the government may
not be able to prove it, and a third party - possibly acting in collusion
with the defendant - files a claim to recover it. 4° Finally, criminal
forfeiture is problematic when a third party, who is not an innocent
owner, shares a legal interest in the defendant's property.
41
For all of these reasons, civil forfeiture will continue to be an
important tool of law enforcement. Thus, prosecutors will have to
137 Id. at 1212-14; see also United States v. Singleton, 897 F. Supp. 1268,
1273 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (agreeing to civil forfeiture as part of criminal guilty plea
constitutes waiver of any double jeopardy claim in the criminal case).
138 See Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356, 364 (1995) (discussing
forfeiture as part of the defendant's sentence in a criminal case).
9 See United States v. Riley, Nos. 95-2694, 95-2781, 95-2778, 1996 WL
102124 (8th Cir. Mar. 11, 1996) (only the defendant's interest in property may
be forfeited in a criminal case); United States v. Jimerson, 5 F.3d 1453 (11 th Cir.
1993) (government cannot forfeit defendant's wife's interest in criminal case);
United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that forfeiture
had to be done civilly because property was derived from an offense other than
that charged in the indictment).
140 United States v. Henry, 850 F. Supp. 681 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (defendant's
wife had standing to contest forfeiture of marital residence in criminal case),
affrd, United States v. Henry, 64 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 1995).
141 See United States v. Riley, 1996 WL 102124 (8th Cir. 1996) (only the
defendant's interest in property may be forfeited in a criminal case); United
States v. Jimerson, 5 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1993) (government cannot forfeit
defendant's wife's interest in a criminal case); United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d
1449 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (notice that forfeiture had to be done civilly because
property was derived from an offense other than that charged in the indictment).
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continue to deal with double jeopardy issues even if they use criminal
forfeiture whenever it is available. The following suggests some ways in
which double jeopardy may be avoided in such cases.
A. Administrative Forfeitures
When a federal law enforcement agency seizes property for forfeiture
under one of the civil forfeiture statutes, the agency is obligated under the
customs laws to commence an administrative forfeiture action.' 42 The
initiation of a civil forfeiture action, of course, does not by itself
constitute jeopardy. It is only the culmination of the action with the entry
of a declaration of forfeiture that could conceivably bar a subsequent
criminal prosecution.' 43 Therefore, it is entirely proper for federal
agencies to initiate administrative forfeiture actions after the seizure of
property under a forfeiture statute. And where there is no conceivable
conflict with a subsequent criminal case - i.e., where the property owner
will not be prosecuted - there is no reason why the forfeiture can not be
completed.
There is also no reason not to complete the forfeiture in those circuits
where the court of appeals has followed United States v. Torres and held
that an uncontested forfeiture does not constitute jeopardy.' 44 All
administrative forfeitures are, by definition, uncontested. Thus, an
administrative forfeiture in a circuit following Torres will never constitute
jeopardy. As noted, of course, the Sixth Circuit has not yet addressed the
Torres issue in a published opinion.'45 Therefore, in the Sixth Circuit
federal agencies may choose to suspend the entry of a final declaration
of forfeiture in administrative cases even if no claim is filed until the
Court of Appeals resolves this issue.
Again, there is no reason to suspend the administrative forfeiture
where the property owner is not the person likely to be prosecuted.
Moreover, there is no reason to suspend the forfeiture if it is based on
conduct, or on an offense, other than that which will be the basis for the
142 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994).
"' See United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that there is no jeopardy until there is some "finality" to the
forfeiture proceeding), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 797 (1996); supra notes 87 & 113
and accompanying text.
'44 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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criminal case. By following the decisions applying the Blockburger
test,'4" for example, seizing agencies and prosecutors can frequently
avoid any possible conflict between an administrative forfeiture and a
criminal prosecution.
Finally, there is no reason to suspend an administrative forfeiture if
the property constitutes the proceeds of a criminal offense. As mentioned,
the Sixth Circuit has held that the forfeiture 'of proceeds is purely
remedial in nature and therefore does not constitute punishment for
double jeopardy purposes. 47
B. When the Defendant Files a Claim
There will be times, of course, when the defendant does contest a
civil or administrative forfeiture, and there is no way not to base the
forfeiture on the offense for which the defendant may be prosecuted. In
that case, the government must take steps to ensure that the civil case
does not jeopardize the prosecution of the criminal case.
The obvious solution in most cases will be to incorporate the
forfeiture into the criminal indictment. As mentioned, that is not always
possible. Even where it is possible, it is frequently the case that the
indictment will not be ready for presentation to a grand jury for many
months. In that case, the government has no choice but to initiate a civil
forfeiture action within a reasonable time.
148
If the civil complaint can be based on offenses other than the one on
which the defendant will be prosecuted, or if it relates only to the
forfeiture of proceeds, there will be no double jeopardy problem. If,
however, the offenses are identical, the government should file the
complaint but move for a stay. The law is sparse with respect to whether
the avoidance of double jeopardy violations is sufficient grounds for a
stay. One court has entered a stay on that basis,'49 but others have
refused.
150
146 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
147 United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1995).
148 19 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994) (requiring the Attorney General to "cause the
proper proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted, without delay" once a case
has been referred by the seizing agency).
149 United States v. Four Aircraft, A94-401 CV (JKS) (D. Alaska Nov. 16,
1994).
150 See, e.g., United States v. All Funds, Monies, Securities, Mutual Fund
Shares, and Stocks Held in Fidelity Investments, 162 F.R.D. 4 (D. Mass. 1995)
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If the case is not stayed, there is a danger that the defendant will seek
to "confess judgment" in the civil case in order to manufacture a double
jeopardy violation. However, an offer to confess judgment will not alone
constitute prior jeopardy; jeopardy does not attach until the court accepts
the defendant's default and enters an order of forfeiture.' 5' Therefore,
at any point prior to the entry of the forfeiture judgment, the government
always has the option of dismissing the civil action and avoiding any
double jeopardy concern.
But the courts should not countenance such a transparent attempt by
a criminal defendant to blackmail the government into releasing
forfeitable property to avoid jeopardizing a criminal case. As a federal
district court in Illinois observed, it does not seem to make sense to allow
a defendant to create a double jeopardy violation by filing a claim and
then confessing that his claim has no basis. 152 Logically, there should
be no difference between a civil case in which a judgment is entered by
default because the defendant never filed a claim or filed a claim but
failed to pursue it, and one where a claim was filed but the defendant
subsequently confessed judgment. If there is no double jeopardy bar
created by the former,' there should be no bar created by the confes-
sion of judgment.
Finally, under Ursery, a prosecutor in the Sixth Circuit could argue
that contemporaneously pending civil and criminal matters constitute a
single proceeding for double jeopardy purposes. The factors that would
most likely be used by the court to determine whether the parallel
proceedings were in fact a single, coordinated prosecution, are listed
above.'54 In short, a court should recognize parallel civil and criminal
cases as a single, coordinated proceeding if the government's intention to
pursue the full range of available civil and criminal sanctions against the
defendant has been made known from the outset of the case - i.e. from
the time of arrest and/or seizure of the property, and the civil and
(lifting stay of civil case where there is no danger claimant will use discovery
to gain advantage in the criminal case, and government can avoid double
jeopardy by pursuing criminal forfeiture and holding property with restraining
order); United States v. 167 Woodland Rd., No. 94-10851-RWZ, 1994 WL
707129 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 1994) (holding that court cannot stay civil case where
claimant consents to forfeiture leaving no case or controversy).
"' United States v. Messino, 876 F. Supp. 980, 982 (N.D. Il. 1995).
152 Id. at 982 n. 1.
153 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
1-4 See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
1995-961
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
criminal investigations have in fact been coordinated within the seizing
agency and the United States Attorney's Office.
C. Where There is No Criminal Forfeiture Statute
In a surprising number of instances, Congress has authorized civil,
but not criminal, forfeiture of property. In fact, outside of the drug and
money laundering arena, most forfeiture statutes are civil only.'
55
Among the most commonly used forfeiture statutes in this category are
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (alien smuggling); 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (gambling), 18
U.S.C. § 545 (smuggling), 18 U.S.C. § 924 (firearms), 26 U.S.C.
§ 5861(d) (firearms) and 49 U.S.C. § 782 (aircraft and vessels used to
transport contraband). In such cases, the government has no choice but
to file a civil forfeiture action, even if a criminal indictment is ready to
go and the offense underlying the forfeiture is the same as the offense set
forth in the indictment.
156
In this instance, the single proceeding rule in the Sixth Circuit offers
a way out. If the government demonstrates that it coordinated the civil
and criminal cases in every way from their inception, and the only reason
they were not consolidated was the absence of a criminal forfeiture
provision, a court should apply the Ursery test in a manner that permits
the prosecution of parallel proceedings.
Alternatively, the government could attempt to join the civil and
criminal cases by moving to consolidate them into one unified but
bifurcated proceeding. Such a consolidated case would present procedural
challenges, but they are not insurmountable. Moreover, the defendant's
objection to the consolidation should be construed as a waiver of the
double jeopardy violation that the government was attempting to
avoid.'57
None of these alternatives is certain to avoid double jeopardy
problems. Only a decision by the Supreme Court overturning $405,089.23
and Ursery could do that. But at least these steps can minimize the risk
,55 See 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994) (when Congress fails to specify whether a
forfeiture statute is civil or criminal, it is to be considered civil).
156 See United States v. Thorpe, No. CR 94-108-S-EJL, at 9-11 (D. Idaho
Apr. 26, 1995) (finding that where there is no criminal forfeiture statute for
violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5872 (1994), government
must elect between prosecution and forfeiture).
157 Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1977).
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to the government's ability to impose true punishment for the criminal
violation.
I. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF $405,089.23 AND URSERY
The Supreme Court will review $405,089.23 and Ursery before the
end of its October 1995 term. 5 ' At that time, the Court will have an
opportunity to clarify all of the issues that have troubled the lower courts.
First, if the Court accepts the premise that civil forfeiture can
implicate double jeopardy in some instances, it should make clear
whether Halper's "rational relationship" test or Austin's categorical
approach determines whether a forfeiture constitutes punishment for
double jeopardy purposes. In Halper, the court said that a civil sanction
would be considered punishment for double jeopardy purposes only in the
"rare case" where there was no rational relationship between the penalty
imposed and the crime committed.' 59 But the application of Austin's
categorical rule to double jeopardy cases has converted "Halper's rule of
reason for the 'rare' case into a per se rule for the routine case" that
threatens thousands of criminal prosecutions.160 If the Austin Court
meant to overturn Halper, it should have stated so; if it meant Austin's
categorical rule to apply only to Eighth Amendment cases, it should have
stated that.
Similarly, if the Court is going to apply double jeopardy law to civil
forfeitures, it should clarify what it meant in Halper when it held that
there would be no double jeopardy violation if the civil and criminal
sanctions were imposed in the same proceeding. The Court is well aware
that in the federal system civil and criminal matters are not literally
combined in one complaint or indictment. Thus, the Court must have
contemplated some means by which the civil sanctions Congress has
authorized for criminal offenses can be imposed in a parallel proceeding
that does not bar the imposition of a criminal penalty for the same
offense. Congress surely assumed that such a procedure was constitution-
ally acceptable when it repeatedly over the past 200 years enacted civil
forfeiture statutes as sanctions for criminal offenses. Indeed, in many
instances, Congress explicitly provided rules governing parallel proceed-
158 See supra note 3.
... United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
60 United States v. $405,089.23, 56 F.3d 41, 42-43 (9th Cir. 1995) (Rymer,




ings. " ' It is now up to the Court to make clear exactly what the
Constitution requires in applying those rules.
The Court could go much further, however, and eliminate the double
jeopardy problem for most, if not all, civil forfeiture cases. The Court
should hold that under the Blockburger/Dixon rule, civil forfeitures and
criminal prosecutions generally involve separate offenses because each
proceeding requires proof of an element that the other does not. To do
this, the Court needs to recognize that a civil forfeiture, as an in rem
proceeding, does not require proof that the property owner played any
role in the commission of the crime giving rise to the forfeiture, while a
criminal prosecution obviously requires proof that the defendant
committed the offense with the mens rea required by the applicable
statute. At the same time, an in rem forfeiture requires proof that specific
property was involved in, or derived from, a criminal offense. With only
a few exceptions, such as cases making possession of contraband a crime,
criminal offenses do not require proof that any particular property was
involved in the offense.
Finally, the Court could eliminate the problem entirely by reconsider-
ing Halper itself. Justice Scalia has questioned whether there really is a
"multiple punishments" prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause and has
suggested that double jeopardy cases be analyzed solely under the
successive prosecution approach.' In his view, Halper was really an
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines case which, if decided today, would
be analyzed under Austin, and not as a double jeopardy case. If adopted,
that view would make all of these issues moot, because as noted, a civil
forfeiture is never a prosecution. Some forfeitures would have to be
mitigated to avoid violating the Excessive Fines Clause, but no forfeiture
would bar the criminal prosecution of the perpetrator of the underlying
offense.
CONCLUSION
For two hundred years it was unquestioned that civil forfeiture did
not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The current confusion is the
law is due entirely to the interpretation being given to language in Austin
v. United States that the Supreme Court may never have intended to
161 See supra note 59.
162 Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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apply in the double jeopardy context. It is up to the Court to resolve the
issues raised by Austin as soon as possible. In the meantime, while the
law is developing very rapidly, courts, prosecutors, and private litigants
will continue to struggle with the application of double jeopardy
principles to a statutory structure and judicial process to which they were
never meant to apply.
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